

Feb 89

Themes/Issues

1. SU as seeking acknowledgment of asymmetry.

3. What risks were they willing to accept?

2. Did "they" under-estimate, or over-estimate risks?
(Both, in some respects)

4. What routes could have led to ^{US-SU} conflict?
to invasion of Cuba? 2nd? his more was? GW?

5. What did K plan, in it, on Berlin?
What would he have done if ...

6. How could invasion of Cuba go?

7. Super-sounding (PSALM) for Sept 7 or (statute 6 Sept?) ^{OR}

8. Wf wasn't SAMs deployed first, for deterrence?

Was there an warning, a deadline, on Berlin?

Was there covered with abetion?

c.s. fear that USG would take stronger
risks, if it discovered SSMS before they were up,
after abetion?

or, was presence of SAMs thought to be enough? to deter
(It almost was: 4 Oct Wright memo)

But see

Questions
for Dave

"

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"

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"

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Thurs / Friday

6 Feb 89

11

9. Did K/SU not consider chance that his message
would fail? Plan on SU response to US moves?

(as SNIE Oct 17 assumed; "retreat, credibility
attack")

[Ref ret: - risks are high

- risks are underestimated of SNIE;

which makes the high]

(However, SNIE's assumption that SU must

have planned to respond abroad, if necessary

- about entering world (vs. "lands; Libya, etc...")

- leads to over-estimate of risks of some aggressive
US actions, due to US caution.

"Bring effects of
'paranoia' - of
expectations ("national")

aggressive response. (see Nitzke, 1961, Berlin)

10. Invasion planning in October

(^{Hyp.} Based on more thought, evidence, suspicion of
possible SSMS than John wanted - then now - to
admit, in view of 1) Rife/Kent's changes

2) USG (e.g. McGE) reassurances, before
election - which went beyond meeting evidence
(see McCone - DCI: - and

(e.g. SNIE) ^{Pres} (Did NSA really feel confident - despite evidence,
suspicious of SU would not do it?

In view of - what?

- Warning

- Balabakou?

- intrep of other SU statements?

This incredulity would not have looked good; nor would
PSALM, which would have looked suspicious (like FOR's
warning before Pearl Harbor) - e.g. as if NSA planned to control tell the.

(Didn't he plan at least to be able to conceal
[print books - $\frac{1}{2}$ Rajat!] "western evidence"
(possible/probable) false claims - tell after election

or "tell me know for some"

or "tell me how decided what to do."

(Perhaps wrong was about refugee reports - false reports
[got - PSALM initiated after II-280 "published" -
to which Pres did not want to react.

F. MA. and major at

11. JFK fear of effort on Cuba, if doing his
assurances falsified (see JFK - Michigan)

12. Was there no intent (possibly) to invade Cuba -
about SSMS?

13. Actual risk of use of SSMS prevented by USG, if
Cuba attacked. However, deterrent effect.

SU FU Short - Use

"Markers" - "loss of control"

Cf. too much in Europe;

PI's

14. Relation of low name to elections. (see

(+ US money!

assurances (which constituted "commitment,"
created "crisis")

(see Michigan - JFK 29 Nov 62)

(SU not going to tell tell after election - to spare JFK

'embarrassment' - a favor?' (and insurance vs. JFK response
to Rogers pressure! But why not hold back whole operation till

after election?

1989 memo: SU fear of invasion - October!

From mole in Morgeson? (error? "Proposal rejected"

but Morgeson was not rejected - and it needed
an invasion - and could have been linked to one!

(see 1964-65: 34A → TG → RT → invasion!
as well as Cuba I!

and Maneuvers: spring '62

Oct 15 - when planned, initially?

What was "rejected" in March '62?

Wh, if even, were ambitious goals of Morgeson
rejected (as opposed, perhaps, to planned schedule,
as of March, culminating in Oct!)

see Midway -
JFK, 29 Nov 62

Was the failure of SU to shoot SSYs - (as before)
Oct 22, or after, simply the continuation of a SU
stalling plan (meant to be terminated in Nov 8-10, not
before;

like, - like + U-2, 1960

- JFK + CI (Stevenson at UN)

- Harbor + Chernobyl

- Andropov + KAL-007?

2)
Hyp: There was an SU/K plan to slow down,
delay, avoid, JFK response to missiles:
maneuvers, lack of clear warning, action, threat to Rush!
(Camouflage planned, but rejected)

6) Chernobyl (e.g. not exploiting SSYs) based on fear of invasion
before election!

- L. T. - SU fear a successful invasion

Themes

1. A lesson: — ^{from} ~~Explan~~ ^{Explan} ~~under~~ ^{under} are still going
(Count operations)
— so mis-learning can still take place!
(of lessons, and of B+W!)
— (on invasion
and role of how "misperception")

2. Hidden fight over "equality — equal rights, states"

3. SU "threat" to ^{neutralize} US global + European FU threats.
(not to ultimate US FS threat; equality of FS threats)
but, threat of instability, moving both,
replacing one-sided US FS threat.

4. SU ^{FL} threat to remove US threat / option of
invading Cuba

then, consolidating SU/Com/Castro "base" in Cuba.
(mocking JFK capitulation of 1960!

and preventing JFK unification of Cuba I!

(JFK/RFK felt at least as strong about

5. Joint FA Pattern

removing Castro, as R about Ortega
Khodafy
Norrija

5. See joint FA pattern —

causing crisis for JFK (starting Oct 16)

and for K (starting Oct 22):

fight for both: Oct 27

K gave in, under threat.

(not a compromise, between the two
proposals as of morning Oct 27)

(no K proposal on night of Oct 26,
which JFK "accepted." That was

a false-sounding surrender by JFK, though
the ... K's proposal was K's!

- US view of "non-haiti", argument of rights
- N: good vs. bad (Real War)

- our global responsibilities
 obligations
commitments ^{and} states, concern
 (result of: divisions (Cuba; ME aid / don West Europe)
 an struggle (superiority)

(see K to JFK at Vina: ✓

"We have commitments."

Don't "misunderstand"

K: you have subtle ways of making threats

NC

- our rights to threaten or impose ^{use} violence
 (both are "crimes" of warfare)
 (for "good," "we def," "threats," "commitments," "responsibilities")
 (We did not ask to be watched at the
 gates, but there is no one else")

NC

- right to control, effort
 (I have follow from use, and right to
use, impose force; it "corrupts"
 "Travel" + "aid" ...

- right to Open Door - "land playing field"
 (in others' countries:
 at least / not of with other foreign
countries, but with the
domestic forces there).

- Open Door wanted to US attacks, if necessary.
 vs. (Cuban Miss (1961)) SSMs (S4Ms) 1962
Mexican Miss, 1962 and not shut

Thus

→ Strategy of provocation of provocation
can of "
fake of "

(Cuba I; Moscow; TG/34A/Plinian; Nicaragua

- Contra strategy (?) → cause general uprising, revolt,
by harassing, sabotaging economy (get any to defect?
see CIA, Aug 62
Chile 1970-73; Guatemala?
(Brazil?)
Nicaragua?)
not -
(see of 1961 dialog with CIA, Tech Services?)
Boston/CIA, Oct 62

ISN'T THIS
ALL BEING
DONE TO
NICARAGUA?

Branch +
Cuba)

- US from (SU hits?) of horizontal use
Cuba - Berlin
see SNIE

- Competition in machismo

(see LBJ/aiders; LBJ/RFK; me to Hon. Graham;
McG's Tatters; McN to WAA demonstrators;
Vann/VC, Korten, 72; R. MA's; JFK/RFK/Castro

Branch - Chile
(RFK like R/Routh vs. Khedafa or Ortega?!))

- Did Castro exaggerate prob. of invasion, manipulate
Sovs, hop half into support + pledge, actually
with SSAs?

Branch +
Cuba, 61

Shinbelle + Turner

Thurs

→ Strategy of prevention of prevention
can of "
fake of "

(Cuba I; Moscow; TG/34A/Plinian; Nicaragua

→ Carter strategies (?) → cause general uprising, revolt,
by harassing, sabotaging economy (get any to defect?
see CIA, Aug 62
Chile 1970-73; Guatemala?
(Brazil?)
Nicaragua?

ISN'T THIS
ALL BEING
DONE TO
NICARAGUA?
(Brazil +
Cuba)

(see ^{mail-} 1961 diary with CIA, Tech Services?)
Rostow/CIA, Oct 62

→ US fear (SU ~~hits~~?) of horizontal use
Cuba - Berlin
an SNIE

→ Confrontation in mechanisms

(see LBJ/aiders; LBJ/RFK; me to Hon. Graham;
McG's Tatters; McN to WAA demonstrators;
Van/VC, Koutou, 72; R. MA's; JFK/RFK/Castro

Braun-Cuba
(RFK like R/North vs. Khaddafi or Ortega?!)

→ Did Castro exaggerate prob. of invasion, manipulate
Sovs, hop half into support + pledge, actually
into SSAs?

Braun +
Cuba, 61

Heinrich + Tamm

Did it all focus:

- 27 1. Saw report on mines as deterring invasion; (after advisors)
and this as urgent?
(changing balance? yes?)
What did McCone (Kestly?) see as main reason?
(Is Kestly alive?)

Did they see it as indication for K of Berlin blockade?
(Querry?)

2. Did they see Sov assurances as "defensive" weapons
as ambiguous, evasive, non-conclusive?
3. Did US officials like RFK + JFK believe this own warnings
||| (42) would be effective? (JFK's letter seemed
to be no K announcement? thinks, and subverted them: not how
"his, ours")
If US planned to withdraw, the moment would
lead to blockade, or invasion (or commitment / warning to
attack mines,
like Migs in Nicaragua)

Ask Sovs. What was the advantage of light
warnings?

... of principle US warnings?
Effects - how?

Wf didn't they (?) see overflight as the big problem?

(Nyp: Too late for US to react?

- give action?
- give advance of SE warnings?
- give SU warning speed of
deployment over in Cuba?
(like David Anders attack: none of
zeros)

What were they not telling?

Still?

0. Motives for US F3 buildup; ^{even} US F3 threats (Kilpatrick) X
(effect of 2nd deployment on)

1. MongOOSE.

X (ONLY cursory

1A. JFK priority to MongOOSE; JFK resolutions for mission

X (denial), by official

2. invasion planning = spring '62
Oct '62

X (dry criticism (McN)
or upstart

3. Assass. efforts.

lack of belief (by McN, others) = significant change - strategic balance, or power

4. JFK willingness to trade

IRBMs. ("Munich" - as assigned to Stevenson).

5. RFK offer of private deal.

X (McN)

6. RFK Ultimate on IRBMs

Secret: X (McN)
[For Sorensen + McN: this was a bluff.
was 48 hrs.

7. RFK warning ^{new} shootdown.

X (don't know, focus on it)

8. MongOOSE after Cuban II: - through March 63

- after " 63 - Nov 63

- 1964

9. PEACEM, + similar restrictions on dissem.

X

14. Sous: What did K "learn" about JFK - + USG - from Boy of Pigs? Vain?
Wall? Kilpatrick? Burke
Feb 25?

10. (Sous: What K planned for Berlin,

if missiles remained? What was his aim, needs, or plan?
idea - (How was?)

11. Sous: What K would have done, on Berlin or India,
if missiles remained; or if invasion.
SCHLES, RFK 512

15. How certain was K that JFK would not dissem? What did he think / hope / fear
would break if he did?

12. Sous: What was intent of warnings & appeals on
Berlin and on election; and timing of project
(was election? To mission from?) (WHY NOT SAHS FIRST?
(WHY WAS RUSH?)

13. Sous: Did offer of a private deal on IRBMs have any effect
at the time? Help later? X

Did SU forecast
a high risk
of this?

WAS THERE AN
INTENT TO SEMB
IN 1964?
TO INVADE SUN?
(" NUV?)
SHOULD SU HAVE
FORGOTTEN THESE,
OR NOT?

38' non-Berlin
miss 8 '63

US: What would
JFK have done -
if missiles not
disseminated, till
'operations'?

WHY WARHEADS
SENT?
45, 274-75

"ing" refs: Vienna

Paris

My CFR seminar

→ Crisis Pattern - F.M.A.

[Dresden

Delegation]

- Ritz interview

- " note

- Michigan

- OSR - Aug 23, Sept 6

- Kilpatrick speech (FU) (Clayton) (Hans)

my proposed message to K, by JFK on up!

JFK July 25? speech

CHECK WITH RIKYNE *

- Effort of Kilpatrick - on humiliation; desire to change "balance" (of FS)

- Aim of SU to match/equal US FS cap - done, inhibit
US FU threat (e.g. in Berlin) (allow SU to offer no umbrella),
as to China: to threaten SU re-use, without so much fearing
US escalation (but it triggers SU FS);

||| US FU threat rested on MONOPOLY OF FS/PREEMPTIVE THREAT,
HENCE MONOPOLY OF THREAT TO ESCALATE.

(Thugh, in '90s: superiority is FS threat
or even parity " " "

is a better basis for US threat of FU in case
there is absence of FS threat by USSR
or on either side
or (want) SU monopoly of FS threat
(= US, 1955-64)

- Link with Berlin (via warnings) & election

- JFK speech before Oct 15 (K anticipated, content on?)

What was learned from crisis?

1. Sours: a) to be cautious with US reaction
- NOT TO RELY ON LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON US! (Schulz RFR, 505)
b) Not to put MRBMs in NVN
(or Migs in Nicaragua)
c) Not to refrain from aid to DRV
- to refrain from putting SAMS, M. 30, in NVN
d) TO SEEK MILITARY PARITY (the hard way) in Nicaragua
BEFORE EXPECTING DIPLOMATIC PARITY (McN protest)
(not N, R?)

US
US:

11. Avoid brotherhood: no crisis.

2. Not: Sours don't have total control over small allies.

- Not: (immediately): STOP MONGOOSE; give up (?) invasion thoughts.

3. Not: bring in real experts on local opponents: + Sours.

- McN claim: McN's law (immediately): not true, from Cuba II (→ VN) 100

4. Sours always back down in end?

"During the screen" (McN 52) - Soutine, Junior

5. "Unhatched screen" is best, + work; avoid "vulnerable" action (Ball, 25)
(Blockade; 34A, RT, troops ("not irreversible" 49)

- "GOOD DOCTOR" TACTIC (if you expect to "deal" ultimately) RNL - pg 28, 65!

6. 34A (= mogover) is worth doing.

(For provocation?)

7. Avoid, if possible, invasion ^{or bombing} (NVN) that might bring in SU or China. (not so much: that would fail) as in Cuba

8. Not: be ready to make major concessions rather than get in large, limited war
(Maybe: ... and to avoid war with SU or China).

- committing efforts of initial combat (RT, troops)

9. No lessons about: - actual combat of us. "McN's law")

- form of Cuba (Vnam, Africa...)
to stimulate us

- restraint on small ally / client / partner

- CR, civil war, guerrilla war

- public support during long war

10. (LSD, NOT N): Don't rely on FC threat.

- when did Keating get his estate, Oct 10
Did JFK believe he had a Paper name, McCon, who was forcing his hand?

Was this a hidden contact in crisis?

How did JFK react?

(see summary of Fomin contact)

(Walter E. Fomin, 1964)

- "First letter" on 26th, always described wrongly;
2d, also, as "raising the ante". B+W, 255

- 256: were there 2 Dob/JFK talks: one in Embassy,
one in prison?

- Role of emotion:

- F.M.A... insult, etc.

- response to violent attack

370, B+W

- by Soviets (on SNIE; Mikoyan; JFK's est. of K)

- by JFK (to match their plan)

- JFK

- Paris issue (B+W 257

rights

military Paris

dip. "

- Castro mentions (AA; ...)

(see B/W 259

see Castro / Marking

see Henthoff,

B+W 91

Sorenson, 93

- What is the meaning of the Einstein/Oran statement?

"New Things" - ^{appropriate} post-mortem (see Shokryarov,
B+W 259-60)

Out Planning } Especially JFK gave more credence to what submitted to SSMs
→ PSALM or (without explicitly SSMs, or his own) thought he would
miracle (as if any, light, out — a real rule, in
without SSMs — as PDS judges, 9 Feb 89)

- ^{US} Improved relations: to Cuba (UN...)
- US 'improving' of status (JFK — McN? — willingness to whig)